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We consider whether market research can always increase a seller’s sales under bilateral
asymmetric information. If a monopoly seller provides a high quality object, market re-
search cannot increase sales even when the cost is suﬃciently low. A low quality seller, on
the other hand, can likely beneﬁt from market research. However, this research has shown
that market research alone does not improve sales and that advertising complements market
research. Thus the high quality seller can increase sales by using both methods. The avail-
ability of advertising and market research to both types of seller results in disappearance
of information asymmetry and eﬃcient trade.
1 Introduction
A buyer’s reservation value may depend not only on the object’s quality but also on the
buyer’s preference level for the object. Bilateral asymmetric information prompts a seller to
set an inappropriate price and may lose him potential sales. We can ﬁnd a speciﬁc example of
such determining eﬀects of pricing in an annual economic report of Japan. Inappropriately set
prices, in particular through a weak grasp of demand and inaccurately set high prices, have also
been blamed for Japan’s economic stagnation from 1998 to 1999 (Economic Planning Agency,
1998; Cabinet Oﬃce 1999).
Bilateral asymmetric information can prevent the realization of eﬃcient trade. Myerson and
Satterthwait’s (1983) well-known study shows that under bilateral asymmetric information no
mechanisms can enforce trade whenever a seller and a buyer can beneﬁt from the trade. In
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1their model, the seller’s value is independent of the buyer’s. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
and Lindsey, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1996) show that the same ineﬃciency exists when
a buyer’s value is correlated with a seller’s. Two marketing methods may help a seller set a
price. The ﬁrst method is advertising (AD), and the second is market research (MR). If a
seller provides a high quality object, he may try advertising the quality in such forms as TV
commercials or banner-ads on websites. AD has been widely studied. Nelson (1970, 1974)
was the ﬁrst to treat AD as a signal to a buyer that the object is of high quality even though
AD is not directly informative. While Nelson’s analysis was compelling, he did not use a
formal model. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) set up a signaling model that supports Nelson’s
results. Nelson (1970, 1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) consider the case in which the
seller advertises the object. Lizzeri (1999) considers a proﬁt maximizing intermediary who
can certify the quality of a seller. In this case, the seller can ask the intermediary to certify
the quality. They showed that the high quality seller can increase sales by AD or quality
certiﬁcation. Moreover, Shavell (1994) proposes that market eﬃciency can be improved if a
seller discloses the quality. He considers the case in which a social welfare maximizer can force
the seller to disclose the quality.
On the other hand, a seller may try seeking a buyer’s reservation value or demand in such
forms of MR as Interactive Marketing, Hearing, Interview or Internet research. MR is widely
used in real business transactions. The expenditure in Interactive Marketing is fastly growing.
According to the MET Report 2003, the trend of expenditure in Interactive Marketing for
2001-04 shows over 70 percents cumulative growth and strong growth is also seen in the US
(London Business School, 2003). According to the Japan Market Research Association, research
business sales in Japan doubled from 1999 to 2006 to a value of 260 billion yen (JMRA, 2007).
Internet research accounted for an increasing large portion of this value has recently become
popular. However, though many papers oﬀer a variety of MR approaches, few papers analyze
the eﬀectiveness of MR. For instance, Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang (2001) oﬀers that a seller
can beneﬁt from individual marketing in which the seller can distinguish high preference buyers
from low preference buyers, but this ﬁnding is based on the assumption that MR is eﬀective.
Two questions arise: Is MR really an eﬀective business method? Can MR always increase
sales and improve market eﬃciency? To address these questions, we investigate the relationship
2between MR and AD. The answer may seem to be aﬃrmative since a seller can use new
information to set a price through MR. This paper contributes by showing that MR is not
always eﬀective.
We adopt a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium to analyze the market with AD
and MR under bilateral asymmetric information. We consider the situation where a seller has
private information about his object’s quality and a buyer has private information about his
preference for the object. Their values for the object are correlated in the sense that a buyer’s
consumption value depends on both a quality and a preference. Both an advertising agent and
a market researcher independently provide AD and MR respectively. A seller can use each
marketing tool or both before setting a price. The quality is perfectly disclosed to a buyer if a
seller uses AD, while a seller can grasp a buyer’s preference if a seller uses MR. We restrict the
class of a buyer’s belief to “monotone belief”. There exists a unique separating PBE thanks to
a monotone belief. Two points are worth noting here. First, the seller provides a new object
whose quality is not generally known. The seller does not of course know a buyer’s preference
for the object at this point. Second, the quality is exogenously given. The seller cannot choose
the quality of the object.
We obtain three results: First, MR alone cannot increase a high quality seller’s sales, so he
does not use MR even when the cost is zero. Second, MR can improve market eﬃciency if the
buyer’s taste is high, while AD can improve market eﬃciency if the buyer’s taste is low. Third,
for a high quality seller AD complements MR. He can enjoy a synergy eﬀect between AD and
MR.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes equilibria. Section 4 discusses the property of marketing activities and the eﬀect to
the eﬃciency of the market and seller’s sales. Section 5 provides some extensions and section
6 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Model
There are one seller (S), one buyer (B), one advertising agent (A) and one market researcher
(M). The seller provides an object. The quality of the object has two possible types, either low
(θS) or high (¯ θS) (0 < θS < ¯ θS). We denote θS ∈ ΘS = {θS, ¯ θS} and ∆θS = ¯ θS − θS. The
3probability that the object has a high quality ¯ θS is denoted by α ∈ (0,1). The seller privately
knows the quality of the object.
In this paper, we assume that the reservation value vS of the object to the seller is given by
θS, and that the reservation value vB of the object to the buyer are composed by the quality
θS and her private taste θB, that is vB = θS + θB. For example, a buyer’s reservation value
of a computer may be determined both by the intrinsic quality like a memory size and the
performance of a processor, and by her private taste for an operating system and design. The
buyer’s taste θB is her private information and may have two possible types, either low (θB) or
high (¯ θB). We denote θB ∈ ΘB = {θB, ¯ θB}(0 < θB < ¯ θB) and ∆θB = ¯ θB −θB. The probability
that the buyer’s taste has a high value ¯ θB is denoted by β ∈ (0,1). When a trade occurs with
price p, the seller receives payoﬀ p − θS, and the buyer receives θS + θB − p. The high (and
low) type seller’s payoﬀ is denoted by ¯ π(p) (and π(p)).
In the market, the seller may purchase services by an advertising agent and a market
researcher. If the seller uses advertising (AD), then he can make the quality of an object public
information. On the other hand, the market researcher conveys the private taste of the buyer
to the seller.
The game has ﬁve stages.
Stage 1. The advertising agent and the market researcher independently choose their service
fees.
Stage 2. The seller and the buyer privately know their types.
Stage 3. Knowing the quality of the object, the seller decides whether to use AD and MR.
Stage 4. The seller announces a price of the object, depending on the information about the
types of the seller and the buyer which are available to him.
Stage 5. The buyer decides whether to buy the object or not. The buyer cannot observe
whether the seller uses MR or not.
Strategies for the advertising agent and the market researcher are their services’ fees, a ∈ R+
and m ∈ R+, respectively.
A (pure) strategy for the seller is a triplet s = (k,l,p). An advertising strategy is a decision
rule to decide whether to use AD or not, given his type and an AD fee, and it is formally
described as a function k from R+ × ΘS to {0,1} where 0 means not using AD and 1 means
4using AD. A market researching strategy l is a function from R+×ΘS to {0,1} where 0 means
not using MR and 1 means using MR. A pricing strategy p is a function from ΘS × ΘB to R+
when he uses MR, and a function from ΘS to R+ when he does not.
A strategy for the buyer is a pair b = (b0,b1) of decision rules to buy the object. The
decision rule b0 when the seller does not use AD is a function from ΘB × R+ to {0,1} where
0 means not buying and 1 means buying. The decision rule b1 when the seller uses AD is a
function from ΘB × ΘS × R+ to {0,1}.
We analyze a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. A PBE of the game is
represented by a proﬁle (a∗,m∗,s∗,b∗,µ∗) of strategies and belief where the buyer’s belief µ∗ is
her probabilistic assessment of the seller’s type, given a price set by the seller, and it is formally
a function from R+ to the set of all probability distributions over the seller’s type set ΘS. 1
We denote by µ(θS | p) the probability that the buyer’s belief µ assigns to the seller’s type θS,
given price p.
In what follows, we make the following assumption on the buyer’s belief.
Assumption 1 The buyer’s belief µ is monotone if there exists some ˆ p ∈ R+ such that the
probability µ(¯ θS | p) satisﬁes:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
µ0 if p ≥ ˆ p
0 if p < ˆ p
(1)
for some µ0 ≥ 0.
It is well known that many equilibria exist in general in signaling games with incomplete
information. We assume that the buyer’s subjective probability for the seller to be a high
type (¯ θS) is non-decreasing in price p. As Fudenberg and Tirol (1983), the assumption of a
monotone belief means that if the buyer is oﬀered a high price, she considers the seller’s type
is high, and if the buyer is oﬀered a low price less than a threshold, she estimates the seller’s
type to be low for sure. The monotone belief is intuitive and standard in the literature of
sequential bargaining with asymmetric information. Without loss of generality, we adopt a
1Precisely, the buyer’s belief includes her assessment on whether the seller uses MR or not. It is shown that
a PBE of the model does not depend on this part of her belief.
5step-function instead of a continuous function as a monotone belief. A PBE constructed under
a step-function is preserved even if we adopt a continuous increasing function.
Deﬁnition 2 A proﬁle (a∗,m∗,s∗,b∗,µ∗) of strategies and belief is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (PBE) of the game if (i) all four agents maximize their conditional expected payoﬀs
given all available information, 2 and (ii) the buyer’s belief µ∗ is monotone, and furthermore it
obeys the Bayes’ updating rule whenever it is possible. If not possible, the buyer’s belief may
be arbitrarily selected, keeping the monotonicity.
The following three types of a PBE may arise. A PBE is separating if diﬀerent types of a
seller oﬀer diﬀerent prices. In a separating PBE, the buyer can correctly infer the true quality
of the object by observing a price. A PBE is pooling if all types of a seller oﬀer the same price.
In a pooling PBE, the buyer obtains no additional information on the quality of the object
from the price. A PBE is semi-separating if all types of a seller oﬀer the same price to one type
of a buyer and they oﬀer diﬀerent prices to the other type of a buyer when MR is available.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize a PBE in four cases: (1) neither AD nor MR is available
(benchmark), (2) only AD is available, (3) only MR is available and (4) both AD and MR are
available.
The seller’s types and the buyer’s types satisfy:
Assumption 2 α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB < ¯ θS < θS + ¯ θB.
The left inequality means that the reservation value of the high type seller (¯ θS) is strictly
greater than the expected reservation value of the low type buyer (θB) under an initial belief.
If this condition holds, no trade between the high type seller and the low type buyer is possible.
On the other hand, the right inequality means that the reservation value of the high type seller
2Since a formulation of the maximization problem of an agent’s conditional expected payoﬀ is standard, we
omit it to avoid notational complexity.
6is strictly lower than the expected reservation value of the high type buyer (¯ θB) no matter
what belief the buyer has. A trade between the high type seller and the high type buyer is
possible, independent of the buyer’s belief under the assumption. If the reservation value ¯ θS is
very small, then a trade is possible between every pair of the seller and the buyer. The purpose
of our analysis examines how market research and advertising improve a probability of trading,
and we exclude such a case.
Since the buyer’s optimal strategy is common in all four cases, we ﬁrst characterize it.
Given her belief µ and price p, the buyer θB obtains expected payoﬀ:
µ(θS | p)(θS + θB − p) + µ(¯ θS | p)(¯ θS + θB − p)
= z(θS | p) + θB − p
if she buys the object. Here, z(θS | p) = µ(¯ θS | p)¯ θS + µ(θS | p)θS represents the expected
quality of the object under belief µ. It is clear that the optimal choice of the buyer is to buy
the object if and only if p ≤ θB + z(θS | p). 3 That is:
b∗(θB,p) =
{
1 if θB ≥ p − z(θS | p)
0 if θB < p − z(θS | p).
The upper bound of the price is ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB since ¯ θS + ¯ θB is the highest reservation value
of the high type buyer. The lower bound of the price is p = θS + θB since this is the lowest
reservation value of the buyer. The seller will oﬀer a price in the interval [p, ¯ p]. The price
p∗ = α¯ θS +(1−α)θS + ¯ θB is the maximum price for which the high type buyer buys the object
under an initial belief.
3.1 Benchmark (Neither AD nor MR)
We ﬁrst analyze a benchmark case where neither AD nor MR is available. In this case, we will
prove that a separating PBE exists when β is smaller than a threshold β, and that a pooling
PBE exists when β is larger than the threshold ¯ β. Two thresholds β < ¯ β are deﬁned by:
β =
θB
∆θS + ¯ θB
, ¯ β =
θB
α∆θS + ¯ θB
(2)
where ∆θS = ¯ θS − θS.
3We assume that she buys the object if buying and not buying are indiﬀerent.
7The low type seller is indiﬀerent between oﬀering the lowest price p and the highest ¯ p when
the buyer is the high type with probability β. If β < β, the low type seller prefers to oﬀer the
lowest price p. The low type seller is indiﬀerent between oﬀering the intermediate price p∗ and
the lowest price p when the buyer is the high type with probability ¯ β. If β > ¯ β, the low type
seller prefers to oﬀer the intermediate price p∗.
Proposition 1. If β ≤ β, there exists a unique PBE, which is separating. In equilibrium, the
high type seller oﬀers price ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB and the low type seller oﬀers price p = θS + θB. The
high type buyer buys the object if and only if a price is equal to or less than ¯ p and the low
type buyer buys the object if and only if a price is equal to or less than p. The buyer’s belief
is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
1 if p ≥ ˆ p
0 if p < ˆ p
where ˆ p ∈ (¯ θS + θB, ¯ p].
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. When the probability that the buyer is the
high type is so small that β < β, the seller is likely to face to the low type buyer. Since the type
of the seller is revealed to the buyer in a separating PBE, the low type seller optimally oﬀers the
lowest price p in order to trade surely with the low type buyer. The high type seller oﬀers the
highest price ¯ p since both types of the buyer form belief that the high type seller oﬀers a very
high price. If the high type seller oﬀers lower prices, the buyer thinks that he is the low type,
and she does not buy the object. If the buyer thinks that the high type seller chooses lower
prices for which both types of the buyer can buy the object, the low type seller can proﬁtably
deviate to the low price. The separating PBE exhibits a standard adverse selection problem
which the high type seller cannot trade with the low type buyer. When β ≤ β, a pooling PBE
does not exist. If a pooling PBE exists, then the equilibrium price must be α¯ θS+(1−α)θS+¯ θB
by Assumption 2, but the low type seller can proﬁtably deviate to the low price p.
Proposition 2. If β ≥ ¯ β, there exists a unique PBE, which is pooling. In equilibrium, both
types of the seller oﬀer price p∗ = α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB. The high type buyer buys the object
8if and only if a price is equal to or less than p∗ and the low type buyer buys the object if and
only if a price is equal to or less than θS + θB. The buyer’s belief is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
α if p ≥ p∗
0 if p < p∗.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. When the probability that the buyer is the
high type is so large that β > ¯ β, the seller is likely to face to the high type buyer. Since the
buyer cannot obtain any additional information about the seller’s type in a pooling PBE, both
types of the seller optimally oﬀer the intermediate price p∗ in order to trade with the high
type buyer. If the low type seller chooses the lowest price p = θS + θB, he can increase the
probability of trade but decrease his expected payoﬀ under β > ¯ β. The high type seller has no
incentive to choose the price p under Assumption 2. When β ≥ ¯ β, a separating PBE does not
exist. If a separating PBE exists, then the low (and high) type seller’s equilibrium price must
be p (and ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB) as in Proposition 1, but the low type seller can proﬁtably deviate to
the high price ¯ p.
3.2 Advertising
In this subsection, we analyze a case where only AD is available (Case AD). We consider
informative advertising as in Moraga-Gonzalez (2000). 4 If the seller uses advertising service
which the advertising agent provides, the quality of the object is correctly conveyed to the
buyer through various channels like TV commercials, new papers or Internet. In this case, we
will prove that a separating PBE exists for every β, and that trade between the seller and the





When the buyer is the high type with probability ˜ β, both types of the seller are indiﬀerent
between choosing the highest price such that the high type buyer accepts and the highest price
such that the low type buyer accepts.
4Moraga-Gonzalez (2000) considers a large number of potential buyers whose mass is 1. The seller decides
the fraction of the buyers to be informed.
9Proposition 3. For every β, there exists a unique PBE, which is separating. In equilibrium,
only the high type seller uses AD. If β ≤ ˜ β, the high type seller chooses ¯ p = ¯ θS + θB and the
low type seller chooses p = θS +θB. The equilibrium prices ¯ p and p are accepted by both types
of the buyer. If β > ˜ β, the high type seller chooses ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB and the low type seller chooses
p = θS + ¯ θB. The equilibrium prices ¯ p and p are accepted by only the high type buyer. The
advertising agent chooses a∗ = θB − β(¯ θB − ∆θS) if β ≤ ˜ β, and a∗ = β∆θS if β > ˜ β.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. Only the high type seller prefers to use AD
for a suﬃciently low service fee. The advertising agent sets the service fee just as additional
value of the high type seller from using AD, and the high type seller uses AD in equilibrium.
Since the buyer is fully rational, she understands that the high type seller has an incentive to
use AD, and she forms a belief that the seller not using AD is the low type for sure. Therefore,
a PBE is separating for every β. For β > ˜ β, since the seller is likely to face to the high type
buyer, both types of the seller oﬀer high prices ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB and p = θS + ¯ θB. Therefore, both
types of the seller cannot trade with the low type buyer. For β ≤ ˜ β, since the seller is likely to
face to the low type buyer, both types of the seller oﬀer low prices ¯ p = ¯ θS+θB and p = θS+θB.
Therefore, a trade between the seller and the buyer is possible.
3.3 Market research
In this subsection, we analyze a case where only MR is available (Case MR). If the seller uses
MR, the market researcher gives perfect information on the buyer’s type to the seller. We
assume that the buyer cannot observe whether the seller uses MR or not. 5 In this case, we
will prove that a semi-separating PBE exists for every β.
Proposition 4. For every β, there exists a unique PBE, which is semi-separating. In equilibrium,
only the low type seller uses MR. The high type seller chooses p∗ = α¯ θS +(1−α)θS + ¯ θB, and
the low type seller chooses p∗ to the high type buyer and p = θS + θB to the low type buyer.
5This is a natural assumption. If the seller decides to use MR, the market researcher begins to collect data
about the moderate price through Internet Research, and give the seller feedback. Though the subjects for the
Internet Research know the fact that the seller uses MR, most of consumers do not know the fact.
10The equilibrium price p∗ is accepted by the high type buyer, and p is accepted by the low type
buyer. The buyer’s belief is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
α if p ≥ ˆ p
0 if p < ˆ p,
where ˆ p ∈ (α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB,p∗]. The market researcher chooses m∗ = β(α∆θS + ∆θB) if
β ≤ β∗, and m∗ = (1 − β)θB if β > β∗, where
β∗ ≡
θB
¯ θB + α∆θS
. (4)
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. Since MR can give the seller some new
information, both types of the seller seem to prefer to use MR. However, only the low type
seller uses MR in equilibrium. To see that only the low type seller uses MR, suppose that
the high type seller uses MR. Since the low type seller’s additional value from using MR is
equivalent to the high type seller’s, the low type seller also uses MR. Therefore, both types of
the seller use MR in equilibrium, and a PBE is pooling, where both types of the seller choose
the low pooling price α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB to the low type buyer and the high pooling price
α¯ θS +(1−α)θS + ¯ θB to the high type buyer. However, the high type seller has no incentive to
choose the low pooling price by Assumption 2. Therefore the high type seller does not use MR,
and a pooling PBE does not exist. In a semi-separating PBE, only the low type seller uses MR,
and both types of the seller choose the same price to the high type buyer and diﬀerent prices
to the low type buyer, and the market researcher sets the service fee just as additional value of
the low type seller from using MR. When only the low type seller uses MR, a separating PBE
does not exist, either. If a separating PBE exists, there exist some types of the buyer who face
to two diﬀerent prices and accept both. However, since the low type seller uses MR, he can
proﬁtably deviate to choose the same price as the high type seller’s, so a separating PBE does
not exist. As a result, a PBE is semi-separating.
3.4 Both AD and MR
In this subsection, we analyze a case where both AD and MR are available (Case AM). In this
case, we will prove that a separating PBE exists for every β.
11Proposition 5. For every β, there exists a unique PBE, which is separating. In equilibrium,
the only high type seller uses AD and both types of the seller use MR. The high type seller
chooses ¯ p∗ = ¯ θS + θB to the low type buyer and ¯ p∗ = ¯ θS + ¯ θB to the high type buyer. The
low type seller chooses p
∗ = θS + θB to the low type buyer and p∗ = θS + ¯ θB to the high type
buyer. The equilibrium prices are accepted with probability 1. The advertising agent chooses
a∗ = θB − β(¯ θB − ∆θS) if β ≤ ˜ β, and a∗ = β∆θS if β > ˜ β. The market researcher chooses
m∗ = β∆θB if β ≤ ˜ β, and m∗ = (1 − β)θB if β > ˜ β. The threshold ˜ β is given by (3).
Since only the high type seller uses AD in equilibrium, a PBE is separating for every β as
in Case AD. The reason why only the high type seller uses AD is similar to the intuition of
proposition 3. However, both types of the seller use MR in equilibrium unlike Case MR.
The reason why only the low type seller uses MR in Case MR is that the buyer cannot
distinguish between the high type seller and the low type. However, the buyer can grasp the
seller’s type through AD when both AD and MR are available. Therefore, MR is valuable to
both types of the seller. In equilibrium, information asymmetry fully disappears, and both the
seller and the buyer act like as under complete information. Both types of the seller choose the
highest price such that the buyer buys the object, so a trade between the seller and the buyer
is possible.
4 Result
In previous sections, we analyzed the four cases: Benchmark in which neither AD nor MR is
available for a seller; Case AD in which only AD is available; Case MR in which only MR
is available; and Case AM in which both AD and MR are available. By comparing the four
cases above, we obtain the results below. We ﬁrst state a proposition about market eﬃciency.
Market eﬃciency can be measured by an ex ante probability of trading, so we say that market
eﬃciency is improved if the probability of trading increases.
Proposition 6. MR can improve market eﬃciency if β ≥ ¯ β, while AD can improve market
eﬃciency if β ≤ β.
12The proposition says that the situation in which MR can improve market eﬃciency diﬀers
the situation in which AD can improve market eﬃciency. When β is small, the high type seller
chooses the highest price in order to prevent the low type seller from imitating the high type
seller, therefore the high type seller cannot trade with the low type buyer in Benchmark. Since
the high type seller can prevent the low type seller’s imitation in AD case, the high type seller
can choose the low price and trade with the low type buyer. Therefore, when β is small, AD
can improve market eﬃciency. When β is large, both types of the seller choose the high pooling
price p∗ = α¯ θS +(1−α)θS + ¯ θB and a trade between both types of the seller and the low type
buyer is impossible in Benchmark. If MR is available, the low type seller can beneﬁt from
using MR and choosing the lowest price, so he can trade with the low type buyer in MR case.
Therefore, when β is large, MR can improve market eﬃciency.
We will answer the question whether MR always increases the seller’s payoﬀ or not in the
next proposition. Before stating the proposition, we represent the seller’s equilibrium payoﬀ.
The high (and low) type seller’s equilibrium payoﬀ is denoted by ¯ Π (and Π). 6
In Benchmark, the seller’s payoﬀ in the separating PBE is given by:
{
¯ Π = β¯ θB
Π = θB.
(5)
In Benchmark, the seller’s payoﬀ in the pooling PBE is given by:
{
¯ Π = β[¯ θB − (1 − α)∆θS]
Π = β(¯ θB + α∆θS).
(6)
In Case AD, the seller’s payoﬀ is given by:
¯ ΠA = ΠA =
{
θB if β ≤ ˜ β
β¯ θB if β > ˜ β
(7)
In Case MR, the seller’s payoﬀ is given by:
{
¯ ΠM = β(¯ θB − (1 − α)∆θS)
ΠM = (1 − β)θB + β(¯ θB + α∆θS).
(8)
6The seller’s expected payoﬀ is zero when the object remains to be unsold. In accounting terminology, payoﬀ
and marketing cost a + m indicate gross proﬁt on sales and selling and general administrative expenses (SGE)
respectively.
13In Case AM, the seller’s payoﬀ is given by:
¯ ΠAM = ΠAM = β¯ θB + (1 − β)θB (9)
Proposition 7. MR cannot increase the high type seller’s payoﬀ as compared with that in
Benchmark; ¯ ΠM < ¯ Π for β ≤ β (separating PBE) and ¯ ΠM = ¯ Π for β > ¯ β (pooling PBE). MR
can increase the low type seller’s payoﬀ as compared with that in Benchmark; ΠM > Π.
This proposition implies that MR is not necessarily eﬀective. MR gives a new trade oppor-
tunity to the low type seller and increases his payoﬀ. This change of trade opportunity has
no eﬀect on the high type seller’s oﬀer if β ≥ ¯ β. However, the change reduces the high type
seller’s oﬀer and his payoﬀ decreases if β ≤ β.
Proposition 8 explains a relation between AD and MR, and shows that a synergy eﬀect
between AD and MR exists for the high type seller. We say that a synergy eﬀect between AD
and MR exists for the high type seller if ¯ ΠAM − ¯ Π > (¯ ΠA − ¯ Π) + (¯ ΠM − ¯ Π). This inequality
means that if the increase of a payoﬀ through both AD and MR as compared with a payoﬀ in
Benchmark is larger than the sum of the increase of a payoﬀ through only AD and only MR.
Proposition 8. For every α and β, a synergy eﬀect between AD and MR exists for the high
type seller.
In Benchmark, the high type seller chooses the high price. Since MR gives him additional
new information about the buyer’s type, he can choose the low price to the low type buyer
if he uses MR. However, the buyer infers that the seller is a low type when she faces to the
low price, so the high type seller cannot increase his payoﬀ by this information. The issue is
that the buyer cannot distinguish the high type seller from the low type seller. AD can solve
this issue. Once the high type seller can reveal his type to the buyer, this new information
about the buyer’s type becomes valuable. Therefore, a synergy eﬀect between AD and MR
exists for the high type seller, and we can say that AD complements MR. This synergy eﬀect
is important in the sense that parallel usage of AD and MR (or marketing-mix) can create new
14values for a high type seller.
Proposition 9. The low type seller’s payoﬀ in Case AM is higher than that in Benchmark if
and only if β < θB/(α∆θS + θB).
The proposition implies that AD and MR does not necessarily increase the low type seller’s
payoﬀ. To see the intuition, suppose β is large. In this case, two diﬀerent eﬀects exist on the
low type seller’s payoﬀ. The ﬁrst is a positive eﬀect by MR. As compared to Benchmark, he
can choose diﬀerent prices to each type of the buyer by MR, and he can increase his payoﬀ.
The second is a negative eﬀect by AD. In Benchmark, he can choose the high pooling price
to the high type buyer. However, since the quality of an object is public information by AD
in Case AM, he must choose the relatively low price to the high type buyer. This low price
reduces the low type seller’s payoﬀ. When β is large, the second negative eﬀect dominates the
ﬁrst positive eﬀect. On the other hand, when β is small, the second negative eﬀect vanishes
since PBE is separating in Benchmark. Therefore, his payoﬀ in Case AM is higher than that
in Benchmark when β is small.
5 Discussion
We assumed that both AD and MR can perfectly reveal seller’s and buyer’s private information.
However, this assumption may not be realistic. In this section, we analyze imperfect MR and
imperfect AD.
5.1 Imperfect market research
First, we consider the case in which only imperfect MR is available. We consider imperfect MR
as follows: even though the seller uses MR, he cannot know the buyer’s type with probability
ϵ ∈ [0,1], so he still keeps the initial belief about the buyer’s type (β,1−β). Notice again that
at least one type of seller uses MR in a PBE. As in section 3, the high type seller does not use
MR for any m ≥ 0, so only the low type seller uses imperfect MR. In equilibrium, the low type
seller chooses the high pooling price p∗ = α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB to the high type buyer and
the lowest price p = θS + θB to the low type buyer. If he cannot know the buyer’s type even
15though he uses MR, he chooses p∗ if β > β∗ and p if β ≤ β∗. We denote the low type seller’s
payoﬀ by ˆ Π
M
and the equilibrium MR service fee by ˆ m∗.







β(¯ θB + (1 − β)θB
]
+ α∆θS) + ϵθB if β ≤ β∗
β(¯ θB + α∆θS) + (1 − β)(1 − ϵ)θB if β > β∗ (10)





→ ΠM as ϵ → 0, where ΠM is given by (8).
The equilibrium MR service fee is given by:
ˆ m∗ =
{
(1 − ϵ)β(θB + α∆θS) − βθB if β ≥ β∗
(1 − ϵ)(1 − β)θB if β < β∗ (11)
Notice that ˆ m∗ < m∗ and ˆ m∗ → m∗ as ϵ → 0. Imperfect MR is less attractive for the low
type seller than perfect MR. The high type seller’s strategy is the same in Proposition 4 and
his payoﬀ is given by (9).
Next, we consider the case in which both AD and MR are available but only MR is imperfect.
Since AD can perfectly reveal the quality, then the high type seller uses AD in equilibrium.
Again, both types of the seller use imperfect MR in equilibrium as in section 3. We denote the
high (and low) type seller’s payoﬀ by ¯ ˆ ΠAM (and ˆ Π
AM




= ¯ ˆ ΠAM =
{
[ϵ + (1 − ϵ)(1 − β)]θB + (1 − ϵ)β¯ θB if β ≤ ˜ β
(1 − ϵ)(1 − β)θB + β¯ θB if β > ˜ β
(12)
where the threshold ˜ β = θB/¯ θB is given by (3). Notice that ¯ ˆ ΠAM < ¯ ΠAM and ˆ Π
AM
< ΠAM,
and ¯ ˆ ΠAM → ¯ ΠAM and ˆ Π
AM
→ ΠAM as ϵ → 0, where ¯ ΠAM and ΠAM are given by (9).
Furthermore, ¯ ˆ ΠAM → ¯ ΠA as ϵ → 1, where ¯ ΠA is given by (7).
This comparison of payoﬀs leads that a synergy eﬀect between AD and MR for the high
type seller vanishes as ϵ → 1.
The equilibrium MR fee is given by:
ˆ m∗ =
{
(1 − ϵ)(βθB + α∆θS) − βθS if β ≤ β∗
(1 − ϵ)(1 − β)θB if β > β∗ (13)
Again ˆ m∗ < m∗ and ˆ m∗ → m∗ as ϵ → 0.
165.2 Imperfect advertising
We consider the case in which only AD is available. We consider imperfect AD as follows: even
though the seller uses AD, the buyer cannot know the quality with probability η ∈ [0,1], then
he still keeps the initial belief about the quality (α,1−α). Notice that the seller cannot observe
whether the buyer correctly knows the quality.
First, we consider a PBE in which only one type of seller uses imperfect AD. The buyer can
perfectly distinguish the quality by the seller’s advertising behavior even though she cannot
judge the quality due to imperfection of AD. Therefore, only the high type seller uses imperfect
AD and the same separating PBE as in Case AD realizes for any η.
Second, we consider a PBE in which both types of the seller use imperfect AD. Since
the buyer cannot distinguish the quality with the probability η from the seller’s advertising
behavior, the equilibrium price must be pooling: p∗ = α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB if β is small
and p∗ = α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB if β is large. However, p∗ cannot be the equilibrium price by
Assumption 2, so a PBE does not exist if β is small. We denote the high (and low) type seller’s
payoﬀ by ¯ ˆ ΠA (and ˆ Π
A
) and the equilibrium AD service fee by ˆ a∗.
{¯ ˆ ΠA = β[¯ θB − (1 − α)∆θS]
ˆ Π
A
= β(¯ θB + α∆θS).
(14)
Notice that (14) is the same as (6). The equilibrium AD fee is given by:
ˆ a∗ = (1 − β)[α(1 − η)∆θS − η¯ θB] (15)
To prevent the high type seller from deviating from the PBE, (1 − β)(1 − η)¯ θB ≤ ¯ ˆ ΠA or
η ≥ (1 − α)∆θS/¯ θB must hold.
A PBE exists in which both types of the seller use AD if and only if both β and η are
suﬃciently large. This implies that a synergy eﬀect between AD and MR for the high type
seller vanishes for suﬃciently large η if AD is imperfect.
5.3 Remark
Remark 1. Since the buyer can observe the seller’s advertising strategy, she can perfectly know
the quality even though AD is not directly informative if only one type of a seller uses AD in
17equilibrium. Notice that we do not consider the other functions of AD; demand stimulation,
for instance.
Remark 2. If ﬁxed cost c > a∗ exists for the advertising agent to provide AD, the seller cannot
use AD in equilibrium. Similarly, if ﬁxed cost d > m∗ exists for the market researcher to
provide MR, the seller cannot use MR in equilibrium.
If marketing costs are very high for the seller and the costs exceed a payoﬀ, then the seller
has no incentive to use them. We can interpret Benchmark as the case where both c and d are
suﬃciently high, and the seller cannot beneﬁt from marketing activities.
Remark 3. If we allow the non-monotone belief, so many pooling equilibria and separating
equilibria exist.
We can consider the belief which does not satisfy monotonicity unlike the previous sections.
Without the monotone belief, we can construct any PBE in which any prices are equilibrium
prices if they are not too high to be accepted. To construct such a PBE, we can consider the
belief that a buyer infers a seller of low quality with probability 1 for a price except p∗, for
example, but it is not realistic.
Remark 4. We consider only pure strategy PBE, and there exists a unique PBE in Benchmark
if β is in the range of β ≤ β and β ≥ ¯ β. However, a mixed strategy PBE exists.
The seller cannot obtain higher payoﬀ in mixed strategy PBE than in pure strategy PBE
since the seller mixes the pure equilibrium prices. Therefore, propositions in section 4 almost
hold.
6 Conclusion
We considered the role of market research and analyzed a relation between advertising and
market research in a market under bilateral asymmetric information. Since a seller can grasp a
18buyer’s reservation value through market research, market research may intuitively seem to be
an eﬀective marketing business method. However, market research alone cannot increase sales
for a high quality seller even when the cost is zero. Furthermore, market research alone does
not improve market eﬃciency. However, the availability of advertising and market research to
a monopoly seller results in disappearance of information asymmetry and eﬃcient trade. Ad-
vertising is needed to realize and eﬃcient trade. We have shown that advertising complements
market research and that a synergy eﬀect between them exists. This synergy eﬀect can increase
sales for the high quality seller. This implies the signiﬁcance of marketing-mix.
We considered only two types of a seller and a buyer for simplicity. There are many
intermediate levels in a real world. We can know in detail how much quality of a seller uses
advertising or market research by analyzing more than two types or continuous types. We
considered only two marketing activities here, but we can allow other marketing methods to a
seller. For example, a seller can costly invest to increase a quality of an object. We can extend
our model and analyze several marketing mix. These topics will be next research issues.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
20Proof. Given a price p oﬀered by the seller, let B(p) be a conditional probability that the buyer
accepts p. Notice that there cannot exist any prices which only the low type buyer accepts, so
B(p) ∈ {0,β,1}.
First, we show that any PBE must be separating. Suppose that a pooling PBE exists. Let
p∗ be an equilibrium price. In equilibrium, since at least the high type buyer must accept p∗,
p∗ ≤ α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB. Furthermore, since p∗ ≥ ¯ θS > α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB must hold
by Assumption 2, p∗ must be in [¯ θS,α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB] and B(p∗) = β. Therefore, the low
type seller at most receives a payoﬀ B(p∗)π(p∗) = β(α∆θS + ¯ θB). However, the low type seller
can beneﬁt from choosing a price p = θS +θB since the following inequality holds when β ≤ β:
B(p∗)π(p∗) ≤
α∆θS + ¯ θB
∆θS + ¯ θB
× θB < θB = B(p)π(p).
The ﬁrst inequality holds from (2) and the deﬁnition of β, and the last equality holds from the
fact B(p) = 1. This is a contradiction.
Second, let ¯ p (and p) (¯ p ̸= p) be an equilibrium price chosen by the high (and low) type seller,
respectively. By Assumption 1 (monotone belief), ¯ p > p. In a separating PBE, B(p) ̸= B(¯ p)
must hold. If B(p) = B(¯ p), then the low type seller can proﬁtably deviate to choose ¯ p since
¯ p > p. Since π(p) = p − θB < ¯ p − θB = π(¯ p), the low type seller’s incentive compatible
condition, B(p)π(p) ≥ B(¯ p)π(¯ p), implies B(p) > B(¯ p). Since by Assumption 2 the high type
seller can obtain a positive payoﬀ by choosing a price θS + ¯ θB which is accepted by the high
type buyer, B(¯ p) > 0 must hold. Therefore, B(p) > B(¯ p) > 0, so B(p) = 1 and B(¯ p) = β. In
equilibrium, since both types of the seller maximize payoﬀs, equilibrium prices are p = θS +θB
and ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB. A monotone belief is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
1 if p ≥ ˆ p
0 if p < ˆ p,
where ˆ p ∈ (¯ θS + θB, ¯ p]. If ˆ p ≤ ¯ θS + θB, the low type seller can proﬁtably deviate to a price
p = ¯ θS + θB.
Finally, we show that above p, ¯ p and µ construct a separating PBE under β ≤ β. The low
type seller receives B(p)π(p) = θB by choosing p = θS + θB. Since B(p) = β for p ∈ (p, ¯ p),
B(p)π(p) = β(p−θB) < β(¯ p−θB) < θB = B(p)π(p) when β ≤ β. p is optimal to the low type
seller. The high type seller receives B(¯ p)¯ π(¯ p) = β(¯ p − ¯ θS) = β¯ θB by choosing ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB.
21Any prices p ∈ (p, ¯ p) give the high type seller a payoﬀ less than B(¯ p)¯ π(¯ p) since B(p) = β for
p ∈ (p, ¯ p). By Assumption 2, p gives the high type seller a negative payoﬀ. ¯ p is optimal to the
high type seller. The belief µ is consistent with p and ¯ p.
Proof of proposition 2
Proof. First, we show that any PBE must be pooling. Suppose that a PBE is separating.
Let ¯ p (and p) be an equilibrium price chosen by the high (and low) type seller. As shown in
Proposition 1, B(p) = 1 must hold and p = θS + θB. However, the low type seller can beneﬁt
from choosing a price p = θS + ¯ θB since B(p) = β and B(p)π(p) = θB < β¯ θB = B(p)π(p) when
β ≥ ¯ β. The inequality holds from (2) and the deﬁnition of ¯ β. This is a contradiction.
Second, let p∗ be an equilibrium price. In a pooling PBE, either B(p∗) = 1 or B(p∗) = β
must hold. If B(p∗) = 1, then p∗ ≤ αθS + (1 − α)¯ θS + θB and by Assumption 2, the high type
seller cannot obtain a positive payoﬀ by choosing p∗. Therefore, B(p∗) = β. In equilibrium,
since both types of the seller maximize payoﬀs, an equilibrium price is p∗ = αθS+(1−α)¯ θS+¯ θB.
A monotone belief is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
α if p ≥ p∗
0 if p < p∗.
Finally, we show that above p∗ and µ construct a pooling PBE under β ≥ ¯ β. Since
B(p) = 0 for any prices p > p∗, both types of the seller have no incentive to oﬀer such prices.
Since B(p) = 0 for p ∈ [¯ θS,p∗), and since any prices p < ¯ θS gives the high type seller a
negative payoﬀ by Assumption 2, p∗ is optimal to the high type seller. Since B(p) = 0 for
p ∈ (θS + ¯ θB,p∗), and since B(p) = β for p ∈ (θS + θB,θS + ¯ θB], any prices p ∈ (θS + θB,p∗)
give the low type seller a payoﬀ less than B(p∗)π(p∗). Since B(p) = 1 for p = θS + θB,
B(p)π(p) = θB < β(α∆θS+¯ θS) = B(p∗)π(p∗) when β ≥ ¯ β. p∗ is optimal to the low type seller.
The belief µ is consistent with p∗.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First, we show that any PBE must be separating. Since the high type seller prefers
to reveal his type to the buyer, he uses AD if a service fee is equal to of less than additional
22payoﬀ of the high type seller from using AD. The advertising agent sets a service fee a∗ > 0 as
the additional payoﬀ, otherwise he can obtain zero payoﬀ. It is clear that the low type seller
does not prefer to use AD. Since the buyer is fully rational, she understands that the high type
seller has an incentive to use AD, so the buyer forms belief that the seller not using AD is the
low type for sure. Therefore, a PBE is separating.
Second, let ¯ p (and p) be an equilibrium price chosen by the high (and low) type seller. Both
types of the seller choose the prices to maximize payoﬀs given β. If β ≤ ˜ β, the seller is likely
to face to the low type buyer, so equilibrium prices are low: ¯ p = ¯ θS + θB and p = θS + θB,
and B(¯ p)¯ π(¯ p) = θB and B(p)π(p) = θB. If β > ˜ β, the seller is likely to face to the high type
buyer, so equilibrium prices are high: ¯ p = ¯ θS + ¯ θB and p = θS + ¯ θB, and B(¯ p)¯ π(¯ p) = β¯ θB and
B(p)πA(p) = β¯ θB. The threshold ˜ β = θB/¯ θB is given by (3).
Third, let a∗ be an equilibrium AD service fee. The advertising agent should set the
equilibrium AD fee just as additional payoﬀ of the high type seller from using AD. If the high
type seller does not use AD, he can obtain maximum payoﬀ B(p)¯ π(p) = β(¯ θB − ∆θS) by
p = θS + ¯ θB for all β since both types of the buyer infer that the seller’s type is low. The
additional payoﬀ of the high type seller from using AD is given by B(¯ p)¯ π(¯ p) − B(p)¯ π(p), so
a∗ = β∆θS when β > ˜ β, and a∗ = θB − β(¯ θB − ∆θS) when β ≤ ˜ β.
Finally, we show that above ¯ p,p and a∗ construct a separating PBE. By above discussion,
the high type seller is indiﬀerent between choosing ¯ p with AD and choosing p = θS+¯ θB without
AD. Prices ¯ p and p maximize the high type and the low type seller’s payoﬀs respectively, and
the AD fee a∗ maximize the advertising agent’s payoﬀ. The buyer’s belief µ is consistent with
¯ p and p.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, we show any PBE must be semi-separating. Suppose that a pooling PBE exists.
In a pooling PBE, either both types of the seller use MR or no type of the seller use MR.
Two pooling prices exist: a high pooling price p∗ ≤ α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB which only the high
type buyer accepts, and a low pooling price p∗ ≤ α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB which both types of
the buyer accept. However, by Assumption 2, the high type seller cannot obtain a positive
payoﬀ by choosing p∗, so an equilibrium pooling price must be p∗ independent of the buyer’s
23types. If both types of the seller use MR, they can beneﬁt from stopping using MR since an
equilibrium MR fee is positive. If no type of the seller use MR, the low type seller can beneﬁt
from using MR and choosing the lowest price p = θS +θB (and p∗) to the low type buyer (and
the high type buyer) respectively. This is a contradiction. Suppose that a separating PBE
exists. Let ¯ p (and p) be an equilibrium price chosen by the high (and low) type seller. As
shown in Proposition 1, both types of the buyer accept p, only the high type buyer accepts ¯ p
and p (¯ p > p). However, the low type seller can beneﬁt from using MR and choosing p (and ¯ p)
to the low (and high) type buyer respectively. This is a contradiction.
Second, we show that only the low type seller uses MR, and the high type buyer faces
to a pooling price and the low type buyer faces to a separating price. In a semi-separating
PBE, one type of the buyer faces to a pooling price and another type of the buyer faces to a
separating price. Let p∗ be an equilibrium pooling price and p be an equilibrium separating
price. By Assumption 2, an equilibrium pooling price must be high as in Proposition 2, so
p∗ = α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + ¯ θB and only the high type seller faces to the pooling price. The low
type buyer faces to a separating price p. Suppose that the high type seller uses MR and oﬀers
p to the low type seller, p ≤ ¯ θS + θB. In this case, however, the low type seller can beneﬁt
from using MR and choosing the price p to the low type buyer since p − ¯ θS < p − θS. This
is a contradiction. Therefore, only the low type seller uses MR, and chooses the lowest price
p = θS + θB to the low type buyer. A monotone belief is given by:
µ(¯ θS | p) =
{
α if p ≥ ˆ p
0 if p < ˆ p.
where ˆ p ∈ (α¯ θS + (1 − α)θS + θB,p∗].
Third, let m∗ be an equilibrium MR service fee. The market researcher should set the
equilibrium MR fee just as additional payoﬀ of the low type seller from using MR. If the low
type seller does not use MR, he can obtain maximum payoﬀ B(p∗)π(p∗) = β(¯ θB + α∆θS) by
choosing p∗ when β > β∗, and B(p)π(p) = θB by choosing p when β ≤ β∗. The additional
payoﬀ of the low type seller from using MR is given by (1−β)θB +β(α∆θS + ¯ θB)−B(p∗)π(p∗)
when β > β∗, and (1 − β)θB + β(α∆θS + ¯ θB) − B(p)π(p) when β ≤ β∗. Therefore, we obtain
m∗ = (1 − β)θB when β > β∗, and m∗ = β(α∆θS + ∆θB) when β ≤ β∗.
Finally, we show that above p∗,p,m∗ and µ construct a semi-separating PBE. By the above
24discussion, the low type seller is indiﬀerent between choosing p∗ and p with MR and choosing
p∗ or p without MR. As in Proposition 2, p∗ maximizes the high type seller’s payoﬀ given
buyer’s belief. The buyer’s belief is consistent to the seller’s behavior. Therefore, p∗,p,m∗ and
µ construct a semi-separating PBE.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. First, we show that any PBE must be separating. As in the proof of Proposition 3, only
the high type seller uses AD in equilibrium, so the buyer forms a belief which the seller not
using AD is surely the low type for all p.
Second, we show that both types of the seller use MR in equilibrium. If the low type seller
does not use MR, he chooses either the lowest price p
∗ = θS +θB or a high price p∗ = θS + ¯ θB.
The former is the maximum price for which the low type buyer buys the object and the latter
is the maximum price for which the high type buyer buys the object when the seller’s type
is public information. If the low type seller uses MR, he chooses p
∗ to the low type buyer
and p∗ to the high type buyer. The market researcher should set the equilibrium MR service






θB if β ≤ ˜ β
β¯ θB if β > ˜ β.
Therefore, the low type seller uses MR only if m∗ = β∆θB when β ≤ ˜ β, and m∗ = (1 − β)θB
when β > ˜ β. Similar discussion holds for the high type seller. If the high type seller does
not use MR, he chooses either the lowest price ¯ p∗ = ¯ θS + θB or a high price ¯ p∗ = ¯ θS + ¯ θB.
The market researcher should set the equilibrium MR service fee m∗∗ > 0 just as additional
payoﬀ of the high type seller from using MR. Therefore, the high type seller uses MR only if
m∗∗ = β∆θB when β ≤ ˜ β, and m∗∗ = (1 − β)θB when β > ˜ β. Since m∗ = m∗∗ for all β, both
types of the seller use MR in equilibrium.
Third, let a∗ be an equilibrium AD service fee. The advertising agent should set the
equilibrium AD fee just as additional payoﬀ of the high type seller from using AD. If the
high type seller does not use AD, he can obtain maximum payoﬀ B(p)¯ π(p) = β(¯ θB − ∆θS) by
choosing p = θS+¯ θB for all β since both types of the buyer infer that the seller’s type is low. The
25additional payoﬀ of the high type seller from using AD is given by [β¯ θB+(1−β)θB]−B(p)¯ π(p),
so a∗ = β∆θS when β > ˜ β, and a∗ = θB − β(¯ θB − ∆θS) when β ≤ ˜ β.
Finally, we show that above ¯ p∗, ¯ p∗,p∗,p
∗,a∗ and m∗ construct a separating PBE. By the
above discussion, the high type seller is indiﬀerent between choosing ¯ p∗ and ¯ p∗ with AD and
choosing pd without AD given using MR, the low type seller is indiﬀerent between choosing
p∗ and p
∗ with MR and choosing p∗ or p
∗ without MR, and the high type seller is indiﬀerent
between choosing ¯ p∗ and ¯ p∗ with MR and choosing ¯ p∗ or ¯ p∗ without MR given using AD.
Furthermore, ¯ p∗, ¯ p∗,p∗ and p
∗ maximize the seller’s payoﬀs if information asymmetry fully
disappears, so the prices are optimal to the seller given his marketing strategy. The buyer’s
belief is consistent to the seller’s behavior. Therefore, we must check the high type seller’s
deviation which he does not use AD nor MR, and the low type seller’s deviation which he uses
AD and does not use MR. Suppose that the high type seller does not use AD nor MR. Since
he can choose only a unitary price, he can obtain maximum payoﬀ β(pd − ¯ θS) = β(¯ θB − ∆θS)
by pd = θS + ¯ θB. Therefore, he cannot proﬁtably deviate to this marketing strategy. Next,
suppose that the low type seller uses AD and does not use MR. The buyer can specify the
seller’s type even though the low type seller does not use AD. Therefore, since he can always
save the positive AD service fee, he cannot proﬁtably deviate to this marketing strategy. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. In Benchmark, the high type seller cannot trade with the low type buyer in a separating
PBE (low β), and both types seller cannot trade with the low type buyer in a pooling PBE
(high β). The low type seller can trade with the low type buyer in Case MR, so MR can
improve market eﬃciency when β is high. On the other hand, trade between the both types of
the seller and both types of the buyer is possible when β is low in Case AD, so AD can improve
market eﬃciency when β is low.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. ¯ ΠM < ¯ Π holds from equations (5) and (8), ¯ ΠM = ¯ Π from (6) and (8), and ΠM > Π
from (5), (6) and (8).
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Proof. By Proposition 4.1, the seller ¯ θS does not use MR for any m ≥ 0 in Case MR. Since
he cannot increase his sales even if he uses MR, then ¯ ΠM − ¯ Π = 0. Similarly, we obtain the
following equations:
¯ ΠA − ¯ Π =
{
θB − β¯ θB if β ≤ β
β(1 − α)∆θS if β ≥ ¯ β
from equations (5), (6) and (7).
¯ ΠAM − ¯ Π =
{
(1 − β)θB if β ≤ β
(1 − β)θB + β(1 − α)∆θS if β ≥ ¯ β
from equations (5), (6) and (9).
Therefore, we obtain (¯ ΠM − ¯ Π) + (¯ ΠA − ¯ Π) < (¯ ΠAM − ¯ Π).
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. From equations (5), (6) and (9), Π < ΠAM if and only if αβ∆θS < (1 − β)θB. This
implies that if β is not too large and if ∆θS is not too large, then the low type seller’s payoﬀ
increases as compared with Benchmark.
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